Volume 73

Issue 1

Article 11

February 1971

Property--Right of Re-entry--Descent and Alienability
John R. Frazier
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Frazier, Property--Right of Re-entry--Descent and Alienability, 73 W. Va. L. Rev. (1971).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss1/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Frazier: Property--Right of Re-entry--Descent and Alienability
CASE COMMENTS
sensitivity of the position and the seriousness or type of charge
alleged. The alleged malingering of a state road worker is not as
serious as the alleged misuse of a high government position for
personal gain. Another state interest would be the added expense
necessary to pay the individual pending outcome of the hearing,
although this can be minimized by increasing the efficiency of the
hearing procedure, or by possible action to recoup any salary paid
between notification of the hearing and the final determination that
the suspension was justified. The Court would then have to weigh
these conflicting interests to determine whether a hearing prior to
suspension of government employment was required.
The Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly provided the welfare
recipient with protection against the arbitrary and capricious discontinuance of welfare assistance by affording the recipient the constitutional right to a pre-termination evidentiary hearing entailing the right
to timely and adequate notice, the right to confront adverse witnesses
with oral arguments and evidence, the right to disclosure of the
evidence used to prove the government's case, and the right to an
impartial decision resting on the legal rules and evidence brought
forth at the hearing. "To shelter the solitary human spirit does not
merely make possible the fulfillment of individuals; it also gives
society the power to change, to grow, and to regenerate, and hence to
endure."'" Goldberg v. Kelly provided a measure of this shelter.
Michael A. Albert

Property-Right of Re-Entry-Descent and Alienability
On January 13, 1821, Noah Zane made a deed granting a certain parcel of land to the City of Wheeling, West Virginia. In the
deed the grantor Zane reserved a right of re-entry' if the city ceased
to use the land as a "market house." In 1964 the City discontinued
the use of the property as a "market house", at which time the
heirs of Noah Zane exercised the right of re-entry and entered and
took possession of the land. A short time later the city instituted
a proceeding of eminent domain against the grantor's heirs and again
acquired ownership of the property.
REicH, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J., 733, 787 (1964).
' A power of termination (right of re-entry) is a future interest
left in the transferor or his successor in interest on the transfer of
61
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Just compensation for the property was set at $85,000 and a
commissioner was appointed to ascertain the interest of all those
entitled to share in such compensation. At Noah Zane's death in
1831 he had two living heirs, Carolina, a daughter, and Platoff, a
son. By the commissioner's report one-half of the compensation
was to be awarded to Thomas R. Shelton, Jr., as the descendant of
Carolina, and the remaining one-half was to be distributed in various
shares to the twelve descendants of Platoff. Several of the descendants of Platoff filed exceptions to the commissioner's report with
the Circuit Court of Ohio County. In April 1968 the circuit court
affirmed the commissioner's -report and Platoff's descendants appealed.
Held, judgment affirmed. A right of re-entry is an inheritable
future interest which descends to the heirs of the grantor at the
grantor's death rather than to heirs at the time the right of re-entry
accures and is exercised. The immediate heirs of the grantor take
the right per capita,' and such right is subsequently transmitted
according to the statute of descent and distribution3 through a successive chain of later heirs until the right is vested, at which time the
grantor's descendants so determined are entitled to share to the
extent of their respective interests in the property. City of Wheeling
v. Zane, 173 S.E.2d 158 (W. Va. 1970).
The controversy in this case was not whether a right of re-entry
passes to the heirs of the intestate; there can be no doubt that it does. 4
an estate subject to a common law condition subsequent.. . .In order
to create a condition subsequent, appropriate language expressing an
intent to divest a vested interest must be used, the courts construing
the language of condition against the transferor.
L. SIMEs, FuTun INTERESTS § 14 (2d ed. 1951). See also RESTATEMENT
§ 155 (1936).

OF PROPERTY
2The

terms "per capita" and "per stirpes" have been used traditionally to refer to methods of computing the share of an estate which
is to be allocated to individual members of a class of heirs or
distributees. To take per capita, under the common use of the term,
is to take equally with other children, other brothers or sisters,
or other kin of the intestate, and in one's own right. Per capita means
by the head or individual. Per stirpes means to take, by representation, a share which a deceased ancestor would have taken had he
survived the intestate.
Baxton v. Noble, 146 Kan. 671, 676, 73 P.2d 43, 47 (1937).
3W. Va. Code ch. 42, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1966): "When any person
having title to any real estate of inheritance shall die intestate as to such
estate, it shall descend and pass in parcenary to his kindred, male and female,
in the following course: .... "
4 The controversy centers on whether a right of entry descends to the
heirs or whether they take by representation. Under either view the right of
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The issue was: how and when did this right pass. There are two
schools of thought regarding this question. The more prevalent
position appears to be that a right of re-entry is inheritable and that
it descends to the heirs at the time of the grantor's death.'

But some

jurisdictions hold that the right passes by representation 6 at the time
of the occurrence of the contingency.'

The main point of argument between these conflicting viewpoints is whether a right of re-entry is an interest in land which is
capable of descent under the statutes of descent and distribution.
Under the second view until the occurrence of the specified event,
a possibility of reverter8 or right of re-entry is not in any sense an
estate, but a mere possibility, and therefore there is nothing to
descend until the event occurs, at which time the rights come into

existence.9 This view is based on the early common law rule that
"seisin is the stock of descent."'" These jurisdictions apply this
vestige of the common law doctrine of descent to both possibilities
of reverter and rights of re-entry. This is done nothwithstanding that
other future interests are held to be capable of descent under
statutes of descent." Of course the argument for such a position is
that a right of entry is not an interest or an estate which is capable

entry passes to the heirs. Compare Copenhaven v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463,
155 S.E. 802 (1930) with Uppington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359
(1896). For a fuller discussion see 37 Va. L. Rev. 117, 125 (1951).
5
See North v. Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N.E. 267 (1908) and Copenhaver
v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930). See also RE.STATEMENT oF
PRoPERTY § 164, comment c (1936); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 344, § Ma (1932).
6 See note 2, supra.
7 See, e.g., Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896); and
Blount v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1889); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 344, §
IIIb (1932).
8 A possibility of reverter is a future interest left in the transferor or
his successor in interest on a transfer in fee simple determinable or
in fee simple conditional. The special limitation which characterizes
a determinable fee is commonly introduced by such words as "until"
or "so long as"; but a mere statement of purpose is not sufficient to
create a determinable fee.
L. Sim~s, FTuPrE INTimiss § 13 (2d ed. 1951). See also REsTATEMENT
op PRO
PERTY § 154(3) (1936).
9
See Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896); Blount
v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1889).
10 Hammond v. Piper 185 Md. 314, 320, 44 A.2d 756, 759 (1946),
see also 23 Am. Jur. 2d. Descent and Distribution § 71 (1965). L. Snyms,
FITruREIN1
ss § 31 at 69 (2d ed. 1951).
ITSee RESTATFmENT oF PROPERTY § 164, Comment c (1936). The
West Virginia statute of descent and distribution (see footnote 3), is a result
of the Virginia Statutes of 1785, 12 Henings Statutes at Large, ch. LX, §§
I and II, and the Virginia Code, 1849, ch. CXXIII, § 1. See 37 VA. L. REv.

117, 124 (1951).
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of descent, but merely a possibility of becoming such an estate upon
the happening of a contingency.
Notwithstanding these very conceptual arguments, the prevalent
position seems to be that a right of re-entry descends under the
statutes of descent in the same manner as other future interests. 2
Since it is universally accepted that common law rules of descent
with respect to reversions, remainders and executory interests have
been abolished by these statutes, it would seem to follow that such
rules are also abolished with respect to rights of re-entry and
possibilities of reverter.' 3
A contingent remainder and an executory interest have no
greater expectancy than either a possibility of reverter or a right of
re-entry-they are all only possibilities of becoming vested estates.
They differ only in their legal operation and with respect to whom
the contingent interest is to pass upon the occurrence of the contingency. There seems to be no good reason why a contingent
remainder and an executory interest should be considered interests
which are capable of descent while a possibility of reverter and a
right of re-entry are considered only naked possibilities and not
capable of descent." Consequently, the prevalent view would seem
to be better reasoned and more in accord with the intent of the
statutes of descent and distribution.
The Zane case, as the court pointed out, was one of first impression in this state. However, there have been previous holdings
and judicial statements which are relevant to the issues which it
presented, including the dissenting opinion of Judge Brannon in
White v. Bailey.'" In the last paragraph of the Zane opinion the
court stated that Judge Brannon had considered a right of re-entry
to be inheritable, citing Ballard, Real Property.'6 However, there
are statements in Judge Brannon's opinion which would tend to7
support the view under which a right of re-entry is not inheritable.'
,2See note 5, supra.
13

RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 164, Comment c (1936).

14 For

a discussion and distinction of these interests, see L. SIMES, FUTURE
INTERESTS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1951).
15 65 W. Va. 573, 579, 64 S.E. 1019, 1022 (1909).
'6A right of re-entry "is a mere right in action, not an interest in land;
that it is not assignable nor grantable; that it descends to the grantor's heirs,
but does
not pass by conveyance." Id. at 584, 64 S.E. at 1024 quoting Ballard.
'7 See, e.g., Id. at 582, 64 S.E. at 1023, where Judge Brannon cited
Southard v. Railroad Co., 26 N.J.L. 21 (2 Dutcher), (1856), which held

that a right of condition broken could only be taken advantage of by a party
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Nevertheless the court, as evidenced by its holding, chose to reject
such statements by Brannon. Further, the majority in the White
case suggested that a right of re-entry could be devised to one's
executor. 8
Several other West Virginia cases provide insight into the court's
decision. In Kidwell v. Rogers'9 executory interests were held to be
not mere possibilities but substantial interests which descend by
inheritance before the happening of the contingency upon which
they depend. In Carney v. Kain2 ° the court stated that a "possibility
of resulting trust" was "somewhat in analogy to the possibility of
reverter," and then held that a "possibility of resulting trust" was
transferrable under the statute of descent and distribution. For the
purpose of classifying future interests, there is little difference between a possibility of reverter and what is refered to in Carney
as a "possibility of resulting trust."
In summary, Zane follows what appears to be a tendency on
the part of the court to reject the remaining vestiges of early common
law in this area and to adopt a less conceptual point of view. In view
of the strong precedent in other jurisdictions, the decision was not
unexpected. However, both the decision and the dictum within
the opinion have raised certain questions.
Unfortunately the court may have left the impression that a
right of re-entry and a possibility of reverter are synonymous.
Although the court clearly distinguished the two in one part of its
opinion,2 the two are used almost interchangeably in other sections
of the decision.22
Interchangeable treatment of the two interests may have been
the result of several factors. First, the principles used by the court
to decide the issues raised in this case were applicable to both possito it or privies in right and representation. See also on the statement that

a right of entry is not an estate or interest in land, White v. Bailey 65 W.Va.
573, 584, 64 S.E. 1019, 1924 (1909). By citing Upington v. Corrigan, 151
N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896), and other New York cases which hold that
a right of enry and a possibility of reverter are mere possible interests in land
and not inheritable, one might reasonably conclude that Judge Brannon in
fact did not consider a right of entry inheritable.
18 See 65 W. Va. at 579, 64 S.E. at 1022.
2190 103 W. Va. 272, 137 S.E. 5 (1927).
40 W. Va. 758, 23 S.E. 650 (1895).
21 See City of Wheeling v. Zane, 173 S.E.2d 158, 162 (W, VP, 1970).
22 Id, at 158, 161, 162.
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bilities of reverter and rights of re-entry. 2' To support its position,
the court necessarily cited cases dealing with both of these interests.
Another reason may have been that some courts use the same
terminology to identify the estates which precede both a right of
re-entry and a possibility of reverter. The terms "base," "qualified,"
and "determinable fee" are generally used interchangeably to denote
a fee which has a qualification annexed to it and to identify the
estate which preceeds a possibility of reverter. A fee on condition
subsequent precedes a right of re-entry and is distinguishable in that
an entry is necessary to terminate it, while such entry is not
necessary to terminate the above. 4 Without regard to this distinction
some courts have used the terms "base" or "qualified fee" to identify
the estate preceeding both a right of re-entry and a possibility of
reverter. 5 Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the two
interests are sometimes considered interchangeable.
In terms of legal operation, the distinction between a right of
re-entry and a possibility of reverter is clear. The West Virginia
26
Court in Zade stated it thus:
[T]he possibility of reverter takes effect in possession
immediately and automatically upon the happening of the
event named in a common law condition subsequent,
[but] the possessory estate does not vest immediately in the
one having the right of re-entry for breach of condition.
He must first elect to terminate the granted estate before
the possessory estate vests in him.
Therefore, regardless of whether these two interests are treated
equally as to inheritability and even alienability, the fact remains
that they are distinguishable in their legal operation.
In West Virginia, where the issue of alienability is still in
question, it is particularly dangerous to equate these two future
interests. This is so because the law prior to the Zane case seemed
to be that a possibility of reverter could be alienated,2 7 while a right
23

Id. at 163, where the court, after referring to a
bility of reverter, held, "Though that case involved a
the principles enunciated as to descendibility and the
to and govern the right of re-entry in the case at bar."
24 See Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463,
Johnson
v. Lane, 98 Ark. 274, 135 S.W.2d 853 (1940).
25

case involving a possipossibility of reverter,
time of descent apply
155 S.E. 802 (1930);

See, e.g., Kidwell v. Rogers, 103 W. Va. 272, 137 S.E. 5 (1927).
173 S.E. 2d at 158, 161-62.

26

2 See Carney v. Kain, 40 W. Va. 758, 23 S.E. 650, (1890).
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of re-entry was inalienable." In addition, the common law principle
that an attempt to transfer a right of re-entry extinguished such an
interest" has not been litigated in West Virginia. The hazard of
equating the two interests is therefore evident.
The court's reasoning would seem to indicate that both a right
of re-entry and a possibility of reverter would be alienable under
West Virginia's conveyance statute.3" Under the conveyance statute,
"Any interest in or claim to real estate or personal property may
be lawfully conveyed or devised. . . ." Although the court stated
that the question of alienability regarding these two interests was not
answered by its decision, just the contrary would seem to be true in
view of its opinion.
The court's holding and its basis both serve to substantiate such
a conclusion. One view on the question of descent holds that a right
of re-entry or a possibility of reverter is not an interest or estate
in land capable of descent under the descent and distribution
statutes. By rejecting this view and holding that these interests
descend under West Virginia's descent and distribution statute, the
court in effect has held that a possibility of reverter and a right of
re-entry are both interests in real estate and therefore are transferable
under the conveyance statute. This conclusion becomes more apparent when one examines the wording of the descent statute,
which reads in part "[a]ny real estate of inheritance . . . shall
descend.. ." Logically then a court could not hold that a possibility
of reverter or right of re-entry could descend under this statute,
and still adhere to the position that they are inalienable under the
conveyance statute on the ground that neither is an interest or claim
in real estate.
Our conveyance statute was inherited from what is today part
of the Virginia Code.31 Both statutes are esentially the same.
The language in the Virginia statute was construed by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals in Copenhaver v. Pendleton32 to be
broad enough to cover the alienation of both a right of re-entry and
See White v. Bailey, 65 W. Va. 573, 584, 64 S.E. 1019, 1024 (1909).
Snsns, FuTuRn INTmnsT § 34 (2d. ed. 1951), see Rice v. Boston
& Worcester W. R. Corp., 12 Allen 141 (Mass. 1866); Annot., 53 A.L.R.
2d 224 at § 7 (1957).
3O W. Va. Code ch. 36, art. 1, § 9 (Michie 1966).
31 VA. CODE ANN. § 55-6 (1950): "Any interest in or claim to real estate,
including easements in gross, may be disposed of by deed or will...."
32 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930). For a discussion of this case see
17 Va. L. Rev. 402 (1931).
2

29L
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a possibility of reverter. In addition statutes in other jurisdictions
similar to West Virginia's have been construed to render rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter alienable. 3
The court left little doubt that a possibility of reverter is considered alienable. Such a conclusion is prompted by its adoption of
the Carney case in addition to the reasons already enunciated. The
court in Carney stated that a "possibility of resulting trust" was
"somewhat in analogy to a possibility of reverter," and then held that
a "possibility of resulting trust" was transferable under the statute
of descent. It went on to say that such an interest is transferable by
devise or bequest and also by alienation inter vivos.
The issue of the alienability of a right of re-entry would seem
to be muddled by Judge Brannon's dissenting opinion in the White
case, where he stated that our conveyance statute did not apply to
a right of re-entry "because it requires some estate or actual interest
for the foundation of a claim to come under this statute." However,
as pointed out in Zane, Brannon reached such a conclusion by
following the rule of the New York cases including Upington v.
Corrigan.4 By rejecting that rule the court in effect rejected Brannon's conclusions, since the basis of such a conclusion was destroyed.
In addition to maintaining that a possibility of reverter and a
right of re-entry are both inheritable under our descent statute, Zane
also lays important groundwork for a decision affirming the alienability of these interests under West Virginia's conveyance statute.
Such a decision would be in accord with a growing tendency to
reject all vestiges of the early common law regarding the transferability of these two future interests.
John R. Frazier
Taxation-Employment Agency Fees
Deductible as a Business Expense
Petitioner-taxpayer was employed by a corporation as secretarytreasurer. In May 1966 petitioner sought new employment and for
this purpose contacted an employment agency, paying their nonrefundable fee which amounted to approximately $3000. Through
33 See Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W.2d 953 (1940);
Hamilton v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930); Davis v. Skipper,
125 Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 224 at
§§ 3, 5 (1957).
34 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
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